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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
EDWARD DAY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890346-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a denial of a motion for new trial. 
Defendant was convicted of rape, a first degree felony, after a 
non-jury trial in the Seventh Judicial District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's 
request for a continuance on his motion for new trial? 
2. Whether defendant is precluded from claiming that 
he was denied counsel on his motion for new trial where he failed 
to request counsel? 
3. Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's 
motion for new trial as untimely and unsupported? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The relevant provisions relied upon the State are 
properly set forth in the argument section of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with rape, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (Supp. 1989) (R. 2), 
Defendant was convicted as charged after a non-jury trial held 
September 15-16, 1989, in the Seventh Judicial District Court, in 
and for San Juan County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd 
Bunnell, Judge, presiding (R. 27-29, T. 1). Judge Bunnell 
sentenced defendant to a term of five years to life in the Utah 
State Prison (R. 39). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 4, 1987, Tanya Wyatt attended a high school 
graduation party held at Kens Lake near Moab, Utah (T. 7). 
Defendant was also in attendance at the party (T. 181). In the 
early morning hours of June 5, 1987, defendant pursued Wyatt to a 
secluded area, held her to the ground, threatened to drown her, 
and forced sexual intercourse (T. 22-23, 193-96). During the 
attack, she screamed "rape," but defendant put his hand over her 
mouth and told her to "shut up" (T. 41). Wyatt persuaded 
defendant to stop by suggesting that it would be more comfortable 
at her house (T. 24, 195-96). Upon returning to the area of the 
party, Wyatt immediately exclaimed to others that defendant had 
raped her (T. 24-25, 56-57, 59, 68). 
Defendant was arrested and charged with the rape (T. 
124, R. 2). At a bench trial held on September 15-16, 1987, 
defendant claimed that Wyatt consented to sexual intercourse and 
The trial transcripts will be referred to as HT.M The 
transcript on the motion for new trial will be referred to as 
"N.T." (See Appendix A; motion for new trial transcript). 
that Wyatt had acted in a sexually provocative manner at the 
party (T. 157-60, 164-65, 174, 192). After two days of trial, 
Judge Bunnell found defendant guilty of rape (R. 27-29, T. 142, 
244, 245, 257). Defendant did not appeal his conviction (Br. of 
App. at 13). 
More than a year later, on October 20, 1988, defendant 
filed a pro se motion for new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence (R. 48). The State responded that defendant failed to 
file his motion for new trial within ten days of his sentence or 
support his motion with affidavits or evidence (R. 50-52). At a 
hearing held on November 10, 1988, Judge Bunnell denied 
defendant's motion as untimely and unsupported (R. 53, 56, T. 2-
3). Defendant now appeals the denial of his motion for new trial 
(R. 58). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's request for 
a continuance of his motion for new trial. Defendant supplies no 
relevant legal authority for his position that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying his request. In any event, 
because defendant's motion was fatally out of time, it was not an 
abuse of discretion to deny defendant's request to continue the 
motion. 
Nor did the trial court err by not appointing counsel 
sua sponte to assist defendant in his motion for a new trial. 
Defendant failed to request counsel in the trial court below. 
Therefore, he cannot raise the issue for the first time on 
appeal. Regardless, Judge Bunnell had no duty or obligation to 
divine defendant's need for counsel. Defendant was not entitled 
to court appointed counsel and proceeded to represent himself 
without any indication that he desired counsel. 
Finally, the trial court properly denied defendant's 
motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the 
motion was out of time and unsupported. Rule 24 of the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure requires a motion for new trial to be filed 
within ten (10) days after imposition of sentence. The rule 
further requires that such a motion be accompanied by supporting 
affidavits or evidence. In this case, defendant's motion was 
more than one year late and was unsupported by affidavits or 
evidence. In any event, defendant's claim of newly discovered 
evidence did not warrant a new trial where it merely consisted of 
cumulative impeachment evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE OF HIS MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying defendant's request for a continuance of 
his motion for new trial. Defendant's claim should be rejected. 
It first must be noted that defendant cites no legal 
authority for his claim other than the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Canon 3(a)(4), and Rule 24 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
In the absence of relevant legal authority, defendant's claim 
should not be considered. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984) . 
In any event, the Utah Supreme Court has set forth the 
standard of review from a trial court's denial of a continuance. 
State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982). In Creviston, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
It is well established in Utah, as 
elsewhere, that the granting of a continuance 
is at the discretion of the trial judge, 
whose decision will not be reversed by this 
Court absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion. . . . 
Id. at 752 (citations omitted). See also State v. Williams, 712 
P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). 
In the present case, Judge Bunnell denied defendant's 
motion for new trial as not timely filed as required by Rule 24 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because defendant's 
motion for new trial was fatally belated, it was not an abuse of 
discretion to deny defendant's request to continue the motion. 
Additional time could not cure the defect of untimeliness. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT REQUEST ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL FOR HIS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, 
DEFENDANT CANNOT CLAIM THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN FAILING TO APPOINT COUNSEL. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing 
to appoint counsel defendant in his motion for new trial (Br. of 
App. at 11). Defendant's claim is frivolous. 
It is well-established that this Court will not 
consider an issue on appeal which was not raised in the lower 
court and preserved for appeal. Floyd v. Western Surgical 
Assoc., Inc., 773 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983). A defendant must afford 
the trial court an opportunity to correct any error at the lower 
level. See State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1988). 
Defendant admits that he did not request assistance of counsel 
for his motion for new trial. Accordingly, this Court should not 
consider defendant's unpreserved claim. 
In an attempt to circumvent the requirement of 
preservation, defendant argues that the trial court should have 
perceived his need for counsel and appointed counsel sua sponte. 
Defendant concedes that he is not constitutionally entitled to 
appointed counsel in discretionary matters, but maintains that 
principles of due process mandated Judge Bunnell to appoint 
counsel sua sponte. 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized a 
criminal defendant's right to counsel in a first appeal after a 
conviction. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963). In 
fact, the Court has disfavored schemes which prevent an indigent 
defendant's access to the courts. See, e.g., Lane v. Brown, 372 
U.S. 477 (1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). However, the Court has 
refused to mandate counsel in discretionary actions. Ross v. 
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974). Under Utah law, an indigent 
defendant is clearly not entitled to appointed counsel in 
discretionary proceedings. Utah Code Ann. S§ 77-32-1(5) (Supp. 
1989) and 77-32-3(b) (1982). 
The Court has further declared that a criminal 
defendant has a constitutional right to act as his own counsel. 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 
465 U.S. 168 (1984); But see State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1248 (Utah 1988), aff'd on reconsideration 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 
1989). It is not the judge's duty or obligation to trample on a 
defendant's right to self-representation and force a defendant to 
accept counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834. 
In the present case, defendant failed to afford himself 
of the opportunity to seek a timely motion for new trial or to 
directly appeal his conviction and sentence. Undoubtedly, 
defendant had the right to assistance of counsel had he sought a 
direct appeal from his conviction or a timely motion for new 
trial. Instead, defendant filed a motion for new trial more than 
a year beyond the time limit. The motion was signed by defendant 
and was not accompanied by a motion to appoint counsel. At the 
hearing on defendant's motion, defendant did not indicate to the 
trial judge that he requested that assistance of counsel. 
Defendant argued his motion, which was denied as untimely. 
Subsequently, defendant filed a notice of appeal accompanied by a 
motion to appoint counsel on appeal. 
Under the circumstances described above, Judge Bunnell 
had no duty or obligation to appoint legal counsel sua sponte. 
Notably, defendant makes no reference to relevant legal authority 
in support of his bald claim. He simply claims, without support, 
that Judge Bunnell should have divined his need for counsel based 
on the insufficiency of his motion and arguments. Defendant 
ignores the procedural defect of untimeliness which could not 
have been cured by appointment of counsel. Furthermore, his late 
motion amounted to a discretionary action for which, as discussed 
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above, he was not entitled to appointed counsel (even if he could 
demonstrate indigence). Accordingly, Judge Bunnell did not err 
by failing to appoint counsel for defendant sua sponte. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant claims that the trial judge abused his 
discretion in denying defendant's motion for new trial. 
Defendant's claim must fail. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides that a party may move for a new trial as follows: 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party 
or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if there is any 
error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for new trial shall be made in 
writing and upon notice. The motion shall be 
accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the 
essential facts in support of the motion. If 
additional time is required to procure 
affidavits or evidence the court may postpone 
the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made 
within 10 days after imposition of sentence, 
or within such further time as the court may 
fix during the ten-day period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party 
shall be in the same position as if no trial 
had been held and the former verdict shall 
not be used or mentioned either in evidence 
or in argument. 
(Emphasis added.) In the instant case, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion for new trial on two procedural grounds: (1) 
defendant's motion was not filed within ten (10) days of 
sentence, and (2) defendant's motion was unsupported by 
affidavits or evidence sufficient to establish "good cause" for a 
new trial (R. 56). For either or both reasons, the trial court 
properly denied defendant's motion. 
A. Defendant's Motion For New Trial Was Untimely. 
Recently, this Court reiterated the procedural 
requirement that a "Rule 24 motion for new trial must be filed 
'within ten days after imposition of sentence.'" State v. 
Johnson, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 41 (Utah Ct. App. 10/30/89) 
(quoting Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure). In Johnson, 
this Court found the State's motion for new trial untimely where 
it was filed twelve (12) days after the order of dismissal. This 
is in accord with the plain language of the rule which provides 
no exceptions for untimeliness, unless an extension of time is 
granted within the ten days. 
In the present case, defendant was sentenced by Judge 
Bunnell on October 6, 1987 (R. 39-40). On October 20, 1988, 
defendant filed his motion for new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence (R. 48). Plainly, defendant's motion was 
procedurally belated more than one year. Thus, based solely on 
untimeliness, Judge Bunnell properly denied defendant's motion. 
B. Defendant's Motion For New Trial Was Unsupported. 
It is well-settled that "[i]t is a matter solely within 
the discretion of the trial court as to whether it should grant a 
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence." State v. 
Harris, 30 Utah 2d 77, 513 P.2d 438, 439 (1973); see also State 
v. Bundy, 589 P.2d 760 (Utah 1978), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 926 
(1979). The determination to deny a motion for a new trial based 
on a newly discovered evidence claim "will not be reversed absent 
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a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 
220, 220 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 
1983)). Evaluations of the trial court's discretion will only 
occur in "instances where there is a grave suspicion that justice 
may have been miscarried because of the lack of enlightenment on 
a vital point, which the new evidence will supply." Harris, 513 
P.2d at 439-40. See also State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 
1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989). 
Further, it is generally held that newly discovered 
impeachment evidence is insufficient to warrant a new trial. 
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988); Moore v. 
Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); United States v. Myers, 534 
F.Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). In Myers the court explained: 
Newly discovered evidence that merely goes to 
impeach the credibility of a prosecution 
witness is ordinarily not sufficient to 
justify a new trial, particularly when the 
newly discovered evidence by would be "only 
an additional part of a cumulative attack on 
the witness' credibility." 
Id. at 756 (citations omitted) (quoting United State v. Gilbert, 
668 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982)). 
See also Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 9 (1956). To 
obtain a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a 
defendant must show: (1) that the evidence is material and newly 
discovered; (2) that using due diligence, the defendant could not 
have discovered the evidence prior to trial; and (3) that the 
evidence is substantial enough that, with it, there might have 
been a different result. Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369, 372 
(Utah 1980) . 
In the present case, a new trial was not warranted. 
Without the required supporting affidavits or evidence, the trial 
court could not determine whether defendant had established "good 
cause" for a new trial. 
Secondly, the nature of the new evidence was merely 
cumulative impeachment evidence which is generally insufficient 
to warrant a new trial. Worthen, 765 P.2d at 851. At trial, 
defendant claimed the victim had consented to intercourse and 
offered testimony in support of his defense (T. 75, 157-60, 164-
65, 172-74, 192, 206-07). In the absence of a recantation by the 
victim, defendant's proffered testimony is merely cumulative 
regarding the victim's credibility. 
Finally, where defendant's motion was procedurally 
untimely and insufficient, defendant cannot cure such defects by 
demanding sua sponte relief from the trial court. Defendant 
cites no legal authority for his claim that the trial court 
abused its discretion by failing to act sua sponte. The trial 
court was not required to act on its own motion where defendant's 
motion was procedurally defective. 
It must be noted that defendant's failure to file a 
timely motion for new trial does not leave him without a remedy. 
Defendant may seek postconviction relief under Rule 65B(i), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence. To justify a release of a convicted person through the 
means of postconviction relief, "the evidence of his innocence 
must be stronger than would be necessary in the first instances 
in support of a motion for new trial. . . . •  Ward v. Turner, 12 
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Utah 2d 310, 366 P.2d 72, 74 (1961), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 872 
(1962). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests that the 
order of the lower court be affirmed. 
DATED this l day of December, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent, was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Keith H. Chiara, attorney for defendant, 37 East Main Street, 
P.O. Box 955, Price, Utah 84501, this f .—ctey of December, 
1989. 
